Thursday, August 31, 2017

Ezekiel's Prophecy Against Egypt (4 of 7)


From *The Skeptical Review*, 1999 / May-June. [This is the fourth of seven posts dealing with alleged biblical prophecies. The remaining three will immediately follow this one]:

by Dave Matson
The biblicist reassures us that Ezekiel's prophecy for Egypt (and certain other prophecies of the Bible) will be fulfilled some time in the future. If necessary, a new pharaoh will arise, a new Nebuchadnezzar will come into existence, and the first will be devastated by the second! Is this sound reasoning?

How do we know that such things will happen? Doesn't it all boil down to the presumption that the prophecy in question is true? Or, is it a case of claiming that something might happen just because there is still time on the clock?

In the former case, why does the biblicist even bother with reason? Reasoning is like a long anchor chain. All the links have to be there or else you lose the anchor! If you choose reason, dear Bible-believer, then it's reason all the way. That is the only way that you can collect the benefits of reason. If you are going to simply assume you are right at some difficult point, then do so at the start. Stick your head in the sand, declare all biblical prophecy to be correct, and let that be the end of the matter!

If we are dealing with the latter case, and if the Bible-believer has any interest in sound reasoning, then he must understand that "might" is not good enough. Giant, green spiders might be secretly ruling the city of San Diego! However, the intelligent mind does not stay up at night worrying about such possibilities. The probability or likelihood of such a claim is sufficiently low that we simply reject it. We might be wrong, but very likely we have made the right decision.

We must weigh the evidence pro and con, and only then decide what the best conclusion is. To accept the claim that a prophecy will be fulfilled in the future means this: The case for it not happening is less likely than the case for it happening. Loopholes, as such, do not concern us. The possibility that a prophecy might come true is not a valid defense; it must be weighed against the possibility that it might not come true. To deny the latter by fiat, without recourse to the evidence, is just another way to assume the truth of one's claim. You may not shut the door to the possibility of prophecy failure without recourse to the evidence.

Anyone who defends a prophecy by insisting that it might come true, and there is always a "might" in there somewhere, is really just assuming that it cannot fail. If reason is to prevail, then we must weigh the evidence and draw a less than certain conclusion. That is, we must select the best case.

It may be urged that a good prophecy, by its very nature, must involve a certain degree of unexpectedness. Thus, our procedure would reject every interesting prophecy. Fair enough. Instead of asking whether the prophecy will probably come true, let us ask whether the basic conditions for that prophecy will probably exist.

Suppose that a certain prophecy states that someone will take a pot shot at a certain politician. The politician is publicly available and guns are plentiful, as are nut cases. The prediction has a low probability of being right, but the props are all in place. That unexpected twist of fate could happen. Thus, we would not reject the prophecy as being false. It is reasonably viable as far as prophecies go.

Compare Ezekiel's prophecy regarding Egypt. Millennia have passed. Egypt is no longer a superpower ruled by pharaohs. It is a modern, political state; even its people are no longer quite the same. Nebuchadnezzar is ancient history. Israel is not the same country; its people are quite different. European emigrants have erected a modern state there. Religious freedom, to some extent, is enjoyed.

Are we to believe, after yet more time has passed, that God will suddenly create another Babylonia, which will launch its armies against Egypt and make it desolate?Ridiculous!

The historical setting for that prophecy, the very props and stage that gives the play meaning, has become obsolete. Aside from making God look like an idiot and a moral imbecile, the fulfillment of such a prophecy would require another pharaoh and another Nebuchadnezzar. The latter must attack the former without upsetting NATO or the Modern Israeli state, the latter occupying the only practical route of attack. An attack on Israel, of course, would bring in the United States. The whole scenario is highly improbable.

Our best conclusion is that even the basic conditions for this prophecy will fail to materialize. Therefore, we are justified in calling it a false prophecy.

Some may object to such a conclusion, but their objection can only rest on that "might" we discussed earlier. Uncertainty is unavoidable. The simple act of determining whether a prophecy has succeeded or failed necessarily invokes some uncertainty. Absolute certainty is lost at many different levels, practical and theoretical. Our conclusion about Ezekiel's prophecy of Egypt is none the worse because we have not waited until the end of time. The case for a successful prophecy, even given the unexpected nature of prophecy, has been ruled out as our best conclusion, and that's all that matters.

The illusion that a prophecy cannot be judged until its allotted time has run its course is based on another illusion-- that we can have absolute certainty. Absolute certainty says that we cannot rule out a prophecy that's "still running," because it might come true. However, we actually deal with probabilities in real life. An open-ended prophecy requiring a highly improbable future to even set the stage is no better than a completed prophecy whose failure has been judged highly probable. Both cases may be counted as "failed prophecy." The former will likely fail; the latter will likely have been correctly rejected. We could be wrong in either case, but if we have weighed both sides and found the prophecy highly improbable, then we are justified in calling it a false prophecy. We just have to live with that bit of uncertainty, even as we must live with the notion that giant, green spiders might be ruling San Diego. The burden is usually more imaginary than real.

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